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Abstract—The cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans placed the withdrawal of
treatment from terminally ill infants at the forefront of medical law and ethics. In
the medico-legal context, Scottish court procedures materially differ from those in
England. This article considers these differences in light of the possibility that a
similar case might soon be called before the Scottish courts. The Court of Session
would then be required to consider whether to utilise its parens patriae jurisdiction
to consent to the withdrawal of treatment as if it were the parent of the infant. The
operation of this jurisdiction is such that the outcome of any Scottish case cannot
be said to be certain, as the Scottish courts are bound to pay more heed to parental
autonomy than their English counterparts do.
Keywords: parens patriae, infants, medical treatment, withdrawal, best interests,
Scots law.
1. Introduction
The cases of Charlie Gard1 and Alfie Evans2 placed the question of withdraw-
ing treatment from terminally ill infants at the forefront of medical law and
ethics.3 Though the law might have been ‘compassionately and correctly
applied’ in these cases,4 this ostensible clarity did not prevent protracted litiga-
tion,5 nor an outpouring of strong public feeling.6 Both cases commanded
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1 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and others [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam).
2 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v Evans and Ors [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam).
3 Issue 44(7) of the Journal of Medical Ethics, for instance, was dedicated to the Charlie Gard case: see
https://jme.bmj.com/content/44/7.
4 See Emma Cave and Emma Nottingham, ‘Who Knows Best (Interests)? The Case of Charlie Gard’
[2018] Med LR 500; Iain Brassington, ‘Alfie Evans: Please, Just Stop’ [2018] BMJ (Blog) <https://blogs.bmj.
com/medical-ethics/2018/04/24/alfie-evans-please-just-stop/>.
5 For the clarity of the law, see Eliana Close, Lindy Willmott and Benjamin P White, ‘Charlie Gard: In
Defence of the Law’ (2018) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 476, 476–7.
6 For Gard, see George Gillett, ‘The Case of Charlie Gard Should Make Us Question Our Attitudes to
Parental Autonomy’ [2017] BMJ Blog <https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2017/07/21/george-gillett-the-case-of-charlie-
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significant media attention and attracted comment from public figures, politi-
cians and even the Pontiff.7 The crux of many of the complaints concerning
the legal process was the apparent sidelining of the parents’ wishes.8
Recognising this, it is submitted that the Scottish Court of Session would be
faced with a greater legal and ethical conundrum—and potentially greater
public furore—than the courts of England and Wales faced when applying the
relevant law relating to the withdrawal of medical treatment.
The legal test to be applied in ‘futile’ circumstances9 asks whether the
withdrawal of treatment would be in the child’s ‘best interests’.10 This met-
ric is the same in Scotland as it is in the rest of the UK.11 Perhaps for this
reason, academic commentary concerns itself with ‘British’ courts, without
distinguishing between the legal systems of the UK.12 The conceptual frame-
work underpinning the law on withdrawal of treatment rests on a fundamen-
tally distinct basis in Scotland, however, since the Court of Session retains
parens patriae (‘parent of the nation’)13 jurisdiction over Scottish legal
subjects.14 It is not, therefore, accurate to say that physicians in Scotland
have the power ‘to unilaterally withdraw or withhold treatment that they re-
gard to be futile’;15 rather, physicians possess a de facto privilege, due to the
flexible interpretation of the law following from Law Hospital NHS Trust v
Lord Advocate,16 to do so within certain parameters.17 In practical terms, to
suggest that this position differs greatly from that in England is (ordinarily)
gard-should-make-us-question-our-attitudes-to-parental-autonomy/>; for Evans, see <https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-england-merseyside-43900571>.
7 See Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu, ‘Hard Lessons: Learning from the Charlie Gard Case’
(2018) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 438, 439.
8 This concern was expressed in academic literature by Professor Gillon: see Raanan Gillon, ‘Why Charlie
Gard’s Parents Should Have Been the Decision-Makers about Their Son’s Best Interests’ (2018) 44 Journal of
Medical Ethics 462.
9 See GT Laurie, SHE Harmon and G Porter, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (10th
edn, OUP 2016) paras 15.04–15.07; Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent & Child in Scotland (3rd
edn, W Green 2013) para 7.34.
10 Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.28.
11 In the words of Laurie, ‘the importance of the best interests test as the central governing concept is com-
mon to all jurisdictions’: Graeme T Laurie, ‘Parens Patriae Jurisdiction in the Medico-Legal Context: The
Vagaries of Judicial Activism’ [1999] Edinurgh Law Review 95, 101.
12 See eg Thaddeus Mason Pope, ‘Guest Editorial: Charlie Gard’s Five Months in Court: Better Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms for Medical Futility Disputes’ (2018) 44 Journal of Medical Ethics 436.
13 See Craig, Jus Feudale, II, XX, 9; Stephen Thomson, The Nobile Officium: The Extraordinary Equitable
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of Scotland (Avizandum 2015) 118. Though itself a gender-neutral term, parens
patriae has historically been conceptualised as the jurisdiction of the King, styled pater patriae (father of the na-
tion) and, as discussed below, the jurisdiction conferred that which would ordinarily be exercised by a father
(pater) in possession of patria potestas (fatherly power).
14 See Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate 1996 SC 301.
15 See Eliana Close, Lindy Willmott and Benjamin P White, ‘Charlie Gard: In Defence of the Law’ (2018)
44 Journal of Medical Ethics 476, 476–7.
16 Above n 14.
17 Such parameters remain, in Scotland, ‘indefensibly vague’: see Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) paras
15.121–15.127.
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no more than hair-splitting,18 but in theoretical terms the gulf between
Scots and English law is vast.19
The greatest consequence of Scotland’s continued recognition of the parens
patriae jurisdiction is that, while in England and Wales the courts ‘can only
issue a declarator as to the legality of a proposed course of conduct’,20 in
Scotland the Court of Session can refuse treatment ‘on behalf of the inca-
pax’.21 Ultimate parental authority, therefore, is vested not in the parents, but
rather in the judiciary.22 As ‘the contentious aspect of the case[s of Gard and
Evans] is the issue surrounding parental autonomy’,23 it follows that the
Scottish courts are placed in an awkward position. While the courts in
England and Wales may legitimately say that they do no more than declare
the conduct of the clinicians lawful in cases concerning the withdrawal of
medical treatment, to achieve the same ends in such cases the Scottish courts
must go further and expressly rule that the views of any child’s parents are
subordinate to those of the court. This paper does not propose to determine
whether this is ethically justifiable; rather, it asks whether, due to the differen-
ces in the law, and conscious of considerations of public policy and public per-
ceptions concerning the importance of parental authority and autonomy, the
Court of Session might decide a case such as Gard or Evans differently.
2. Gard and Evans
A. The Factual Background
Charlie Gard had been diagnosed with a rare disease24 which had rendered
him severely disabled. His prognosis was described as dire and against this
backdrop, his parents accepted that his life at present was not worth sustaining
unless there was some available treatment. Contrary to medical advice, they
wished to take him abroad for entirely experimental and untested therapy,
which even the consultant in question viewed as extremely unlikely to trigger
any improvement, and as only holding out a theoretical possibility of working.
18 As Laurie observed in his 1999 article (n 11), while Scots law would appear to formally require the court
to be called upon in each and every case to consent (or refuse) on behalf of each and every incapax, this does
not happen in practice; in the 10th edition of Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (published in
2016), Laurie and his co-editors note that the consequences of Law Hospital were such that ‘decisions could be
made on medical grounds and independently of the courts’: see Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.125.
19 Indeed, it has been observed that one cannot simply ‘assume that the conception of best interests offered
by the English courts is suitable in a legal system such as that of Scotland which purports to exercise the parens
patriae jurisdiction’ (Laurie (n 11) 104), however much commonality may be assumed in practice.
20 Laurie (n 11) 101.
21 Laurie (n 11) 101.
22 In an (admittedly) English case (though the principle is, it is submitted, identical in Scotland now as it
was in England then), Lord Esher MR described parens patriae jurisdiction as ‘a paternal jurisdiction’ which
allows the court to ‘supersed[e] the natural guardianship of the parent’: see R v Gyngall [1893] 2 QB 232, 239.
23 Gillett (n 6); Gillet is speaking only of the case of Gard, but it is submitted that his statement may be read
as equally applicable to Alfie Evan’s situation.
24 Infantile onset encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome, or MDDS.
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Alfie Evans was diagnosed with a progressive neurological condition and a
similar prognosis to Charlie. His doctors had determined that there was no
longer any viable treatment to improve his condition or halt his decline, and
sought a declarator from the court that it was no longer lawful to continue
ventilation, as it was not in his best interests. His parents wanted to take him
abroad, to be able to continue life support for longer, followed ultimately by
taking him home to die within their own timeframe.
Francis J heard the case of Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and others,25
and set out a clear statement about the court’s involvement in such cases:
Some people might ask why the court becomes involved at all, why should the
parents not be the ones to decide? A child’s parents having parental responsibility
have the power to give consent for their child to undergo treatment, but overriding
control is vested in the court exercising its independent and objective judgment in
the child’s best interests.26
In asserting that ‘best interests’ is the only test to be applied here, the judge
used well-established case law27 to reinforce the need for the court to make an
objective assessment of what is in the child’s best interests, balancing the com-
peting factors and using a ‘balance sheet approach’ where appropriate.28 He
also highlighted the dicta on best interests in Aintree University Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust v James,29 on withholding or withdrawing treatment from an
incompetent adult patient. There it was emphasised that, under section 1(5)
of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the assessment of best interests is based on
whether it is in the patient’s best interests to be given the treatment, not
whether it is in their best interests for it to be withdrawn. This relies on the
nature of consent in these cases. The court consents on behalf of the incom-
petent patient, and if the treatment is not in that patient’s best interests, there
can be no question of the court consenting to that treatment. Thus, continu-
ing that treatment becomes unlawful,30 as there is no basis on which the court
can rest its consent. It should be noted here that the language used bears out
the reality of the position of the English courts; that they are declaring the
doctors’ proposed course of action to be lawful, rather than imposing their
own decision as to treatment.
Charlie’s parents, however, appealed31 on the grounds that the judge had
failed to appropriately balance the benefits and burdens, and also that, where
parents proposed alternative viable treatment, the court could only overrule if
25 Above n 1.
26 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 1) para 36. As is demonstrated later, overriding control is not vested in
the Scottish courts in the same manner as in the English courts.
27 Including Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2006] FLR 554 and An NHS Trust v MB [2006] 2 FLR 319.
The reference to Wyatt in the text of Francis J’s judgment is erroneously printed as ‘[2000] 1 FLR 554’, which
refers to a page midway through the report of Re, R-B (A Patient) v Official Solicitor [2000] 1 FLR 549.
28 For an example, see MB (ibid) para 60.
29 [2013] UKSC 67.
30 ibid para 22.
31 In Re Gard (a child) (child on life support: withdrawal of treatment) [2018] 4 WLR 5.
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it would be likely to cause significant harm to the child, and that the usual
best interests test did not apply in this context. However, not all cases involve
factors which can be so balanced;32 since there was no longer any treatment
which could offer any benefit, there was simply nothing which required to be
balanced against the burdens of continued treatment.
The case of Alfie Evans and his parents’ determined attempts to secure con-
tinued treatment has a lengthy judicial history. The case came to court follow-
ing irreconcilable differences between the hospital (proposing withdrawal of
futile treatment and provision of palliative care only) and his parents (propos-
ing relocation to another facility and continued treatment). Hayden J, in the
High Court,33 relied on a legal framework for decision making which he
described as both easy to state and hard to apply: in making these decisions,
the best interests of the child are ‘the lode star which guides the Court’s
approach’.34 He concluded that ‘the continued provision of ventilation, in cir-
cumstances which I am persuaded is futile, now compromises Alfie’s future
dignity and fails to respect his autonomy. I am satisfied that continued ventila-
tory support is no longer in Alfie’s best interests.’35 Since it was no longer law-
ful for it to be continued, it would be both lawful and in his best interests for
him to be extubated and given palliative care. Subsequent hearings drew no
more favourable conclusions in the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court or
the European Court of Human Rights.36 The case returned to the High
Court, but only to determine an appropriate end of life plan, which Hayden J
endorsed. At the same time, he also dismissed a habeus corpus application, and
a subsequent further appeal to the Supreme Court and application to the
European Court of Human Rights were rejected, as were subsequent separate
applications for leave to appeal by both parents.37
B. ‘Significant Harm’ and the Relevance of Parental Autonomy
An argument based on significant harm was raised de novo on appeal in
Gard.38 It relied on the concept of parental autonomy and the right of parents
to make treatment decisions for their child. It was argued that if parents pro-
posed a viable alternative treatment, then it must be preferred unless it was
likely to cause significant harm to the child. This significant harm test comes
from In Re King,39 where the parents put forward a different type of radiother-
apy treatment from that proposed by the hospital. They removed their child
from the hospital and headed to Spain, where they were arrested and the child
32 ibid 10.
33 Alder Hey (n 2).
34 Alder Hey (n 2) para 47.
35 Alder Hey (n 2) para 66.
36 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v Evans and Ors [2018] EWHC 818 (Fam), para 2.
37 Evans and James v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust, Alfie Evans [2018] EWCA 984 (Civ).
38 Above n 31.
39 [2014] 2 FLR 855.
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was returned to the UK and made a ward of court. Baker J held that parents
have responsibility for deciding on treatment for their children without inter-
ference, unless the child is suffering or is likely to suffer as a result of receiving
care which no reasonable parent would give their child. This test is in line
with the Children Act 1989, section 31, which applies ‘significant harm’ as
the threshold for placing a child in local authority care.
In rejecting this argument in Charlie’s case, it was held that ‘the sole prin-
ciple is that the best interests of the child must prevail and that must apply
even to cases where parents, for the best of motives, hold on to some alterna-
tive view’.40 The court made it clear that In Re King was a very different case,
where the parents were proposing other treatment which was on a roughly
equal footing with that proposed by the doctors. In such cases, the court
could properly allow parental autonomy to take precedence. However,
Charlie’s parents were not proposing a course of treatment which could
amount to a viable alternative, and thus there was no basis for invoking King,
or for supplanting the best interests test.41 The decision that nucleoside ther-
apy was unlawful ‘result[ed] from a 100%, child focused, court-led evaluation
where the one issue was whether or not the therapy was in the child’s best
interests’.42
Alfie’s parents, like Charlie’s, also attempted to raise an argument based on
the significant harm test. Their position was that the ‘best interests’ of Alfie
was not the determining test but that the proper determination was whether
their plans to continue treatment elsewhere would be likely to cause him sig-
nificant harm. This issue had not been raised before Hayden J and relied on
an analogy between Alfie’s situation and section 31 of the Children Act 1989,
which applies a significant harm test in care proceedings as a barrier to over-
hasty removal of a child from its parents. Significant harm operates as a
threshold to justify state interference in what is properly the family domain,
but this only applies in care and removal cases, which are of a quite different
species. In proceedings related to the withdrawal of treatment from a child, it
was found that the ‘best interests test’ (described as the ‘gold-standard test’)—
must be applied.43
The argument for using significant harm as the appropriate threshold here
is put forward at least in part because it is felt that it takes due account of the
realm of privacy which exists within the family context, and the extent to
which parents are the best arbiters of the wider aspects of decision making for
children. This encompasses more than the instant decision; it also includes a
breadth of other value decisions which reflect that particular family and its
40 Gard (n 31) 21.
41 Gard (n 31) 21.
42 Gard (n 31) 22.
43 Evans and Ors v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust, Alfie Evans (by his Children’s Guardian)
UKSC 2018 WL 03440352, paras 15–16.
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beliefs and values.44 This is further reinforced for proponents of the significant
harm test by the extent to which allowing this greater degree of parental
autonomy operates to encourage and entrench the pluralism which exists with-
in our society, and gives effect to the liberal values of freedom of expression,
religion and the right to privacy itself. These freedoms and rights are best
upheld, it is argued in this context, by leaving decision making within the
sphere of the family, and in the hands of those with parental authority over
the child.45 Auckland and Goold cite Goldstein46 here, asserting that, in situa-
tions where reasonable individuals can and do disagree, the existence of that
reasonable disagreement between them means there is no objectively right or
wrong approach. The assertion is, again, that parents are the best decision
makers in these situations, unless their decision would raise a serious risk of
significant harm.
Auckland and Goold apply this to Gard, which they classify as a case about
balancing the potential harm of undergoing the parents’ desired experimental
treatment, against the possible benefits Charlie might gain, and that since
decisions about what is best for the child often revolve around values, parents
(who are said to be best placed to decide which values are of most significance
to them as a family unit) are the appropriate decision makers. In adopting this
position, the authors also assert that such an approach affords us the means to
both recognise and protect differences in views and values, which should be
tolerated.47 However, the countervailing view, and the view expressed by the
court in Gard in adhering to the best interests test, is that Charlie’s situation
is precisely not one in which harm and benefit can be balanced.
In rejecting this ‘balancing’ approach, the court made it clear that they
could not balance the potential benefits of the experimental treatment against
the potential burdens, because the experimental treatment was incapable of
achieving any improvement in Charlie’s condition, and therefore all that
remained was the burden imposed on him by continued life support. This
conclusion then justified the court in taking decisional authority away from
the parents and using the best interests test to set out what the court deter-
mined to be the appropriate course of action. Auckland and Goold also raise
cases of factual disputes between parents and doctors as a situation where the
significant harm test should be employed in place of the best interests test, un-
less and until the parents’ decisions risk significant harm to the child.48 They
argue that parents routinely make errors of fact in respect of decisions they
44 On this, see Cressida Auckland and Imogen Goold, ‘Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant
Harms: Who Should Have the Final Say over a Child’s Medical care?’ (2019) 78(2) CLJ 287, 288.
45 ibid 299–300.
46 Joseph Goldstein, ‘Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of Parental Autonomy’
(1977) 86 Yale LJ 645, 650; Auckland and Goold (n 44) 300.
47 Auckland and Goold (n 44) 301.
48 Auckland and Goold (n 44) 303.
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take for their children, but that in most cases these are not sufficiently serious
to justify overriding the privacy otherwise afforded to the family.
While this argument may hold for many situations, and may also hold for
situations involving disputes as to which of two broadly equal treatments
should be undertaken, it cannot hold for cases such as Gard, where the errors
of fact disputed before the High Court related to the parents’ belief in the po-
tential efficacy of an experimental treatment which was unsupported by the
scientific evidence. Their error here would not be something which would
have minimal impact on their child’s life, as continuing life support in order to
move Charlie so he could begin the experimental treatment would have
harmed him as it would have amounted to futile treatment, with unknown
risks and side effects, which had no prospect of offering any benefit.
Gollop and Pope put forward some contrary views, to counter suggestions
that the significant harm test would provide a better outcome in these cases.49
Referencing R (A Child),50 which involved the local authority using care pro-
ceedings and the significant harm test as it appears in section 31 of the
Children Act 1989, they highlight the potential ‘chilling effect’ of the signifi-
cant harm test. In R, the child’s mother had ultimately refused consent for
antibiotics to be administered, which precipitated the care proceedings. In set-
ting out their case under section 31, the local authority had pulled together
every instance of disagreement between her and the doctors, and every refusal
she had made up to that point, to strengthen their case. Gollop and Pope con-
tend that this poses real risks for parents, were the significant harm test to be
adopted into medical decision-making cases, as it might well leave parents
feeling they cannot stand up for what they believe to be in the best interests of
their child, for fear that each time they do so, it would be reported to the local
authority under the guise of safeguarding the child, and that parents would
therefore effectively build a case against themselves as having caused signifi-
cant harm.
Within the relevant English and Welsh legislation, conceptions of parent-
hood are founded on the parents’ normal rights (and duties) to care for and
decide for their children, to protect their welfare and interests, and involve a
blend of rights over, balanced by responsibilities for, the child.51 In the face of
any challenge to this parental authority, whether that comes from doctors
holding contrary views as to treatment (and, by implication, what treatment is
or is not harmful52) or the court stepping in to determine the child’s best
49 Katie Gollop and Sarah Pope, ‘Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and R (A Child): Why a Medical Treatment
Significant Harm Test Would Hinder not Help’ <http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/charlie-gard-alfie-evans-
and-r-a-child-why-a-medical-treatment-significant-harm-test-would-hinder-not-help/>
50 [2018] EWFC 28.
51 As set out in the Children Act 1989, s 3.
52 There is a significant body of literature on this. See Douglas Diekema, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical
Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention’ (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine 243. See
also Gillon (n 8) 462, where he states that ‘the law should allow parents to decide their children’s best interests
unless . . . substantial harms or substantial injustices would result’.
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interests, it is understandable that this affront to parental control could be-
come a battleground, but it is important here to remember that none of the
arguments put forward in favour of the best interests approach above, and in
both Gard and Evans, involve the complete elision of parental views. Those
views are important for many reasons, not least some of those highlighted by
Auckland and Goold in favour of the significant harm test (the wider familial
context, beliefs and values), but the ‘gold standard’ of the best interests test
demands a child-centric approach, which has to mean that parental views
become part of the overall picture, rather than determinative of the decision
to be made. Recognition of the fact that parents will not find this an easy pos-
ition to accept is implicit in Francis J’s judgment in Gard, where he concludes
with a plea for some form of mediation to attempt to avoid adversarial
proceedings.53
The debate concerning ‘significant harm’, in this context, affords little guid-
ance to Scots lawyers. The direction in which English law has developed is
not mirrored in Scotland, despite the view that medical law permeates the
jurisdictional border intact. The legislative basis for the ‘significant harm’ test,
section 31 of the Children Act 1989, does not apply in Scotland and it cannot
be presumed that, in the absence of comparable legislation, the Scottish courts
would develop Scots law in lockstep with England.54 Nevertheless, the con-
cept of ‘best interests’ does indeed operate in Scots law in like manner to
English, as indicated by the case of Finlayson, Applicant.55 In this case, the
parents of a nine-year-old haemophiliac child had refused consent to the
standard treatment for that disease. The court overruled the decision of
the parents on the grounds that this refusal of treatment was not in the ‘best
interests’ of the child; such a refusal of treatment was deemed likely to cause
unnecessary suffering and/or seriously impair the child’s health or development.
The context of Findlayson is quite different to that of Gard and Evans, how-
ever. Primarily, this case was concerned with aspects of social work and care
proceedings under a Children’s Hearing—the adjectival law governing which is
quite distinct from the laws of procedure that would govern any case concern-
ing the withdrawal of medical treatment from a patient in Scotland.56
Although the case invoked the ‘best interests’ test, ultimately the judgment
contains no further discussion of parental autonomy or the right of the court
to intervene. The importance of the concept of ‘parental autonomy’ in cases
involving children cannot be overstated; as discussed below, in most Western
jurisdictions,57 the law takes the principle of ‘patient autonomy’ as a principal
53 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 1) para 130.
54 See Children Act 1989, s 108 (11).
55 1989 SCLR 601.
56 For one thing, the case was decided by a sheriff (who lacks parens patriae jurisdiction) rather than a sen-
ator of the College of Justice sitting in the Court of Session; any case concerning the withdrawal of medical
treatment would be heard by the latter, rather than the former.
57 See n 58 below.
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starting point in medico-legal matters and, where the patient themself lacks
capacity to make decisions, the law must make provision to determine who (or
which body) ought to be empowered to make decisions on behalf of the inca-
pax. As will be seen in what follows, the decision of the court under parens
patriae in Scotland would involve taking a significantly different approach to
the relative standing of clinicians and parents.
C. Decision Making: The Principle of Autonomy v Best Interests
Cases such as Gard and Evans show how theoretical niceties can become infin-
itely more difficult in practice, particularly in cases involving heightened emo-
tions. However, those theoretical niceties require some discussion in the
context of understanding the court’s role and approach to decision making.
Decision making falls into two broad camps: one based on the exercise of au-
tonomy by a competent adult and one based on the application of the best
interests test for those who are, or have always been, incompetent. Both have
generated significant case law and resulted in the spillage of a good deal of
academic ink. And yet, human experience, and the frontiers of medical innov-
ation, continue to generate novel issues to trouble courts and commentators.
Determining an appropriate course of action in the case of a terminally ill in-
fant, whose parents and doctors fundamentally disagree, will present such an
issue for the Scottish courts when it (inevitably) arises this side of the border.
A fundamental aspect of medical law revolves around the definitions of both
the process of decision making and the identity of the decision maker.
Recognising the value of the concept of ‘autonomy’, in common law and civil-
ian jurisdictions alike, competent adults are recognised as holding the right to
be the sole arbiter of treatment decisions.58 ‘Autonomy’ finds its first expres-
sion (as autos nomos, or self-rule) as a political concept applied to the inde-
pendent city states within Ancient Greece,59 and has a significant role in,
among others, Kantian conceptions of free will and moral agency,60 but this
lies outside our present scope. In bioethics, autonomy has often been viewed
as sitting at the apex of four principles in Beauchamp and Childress’s concept
of principlism.61 While it is often viewed as primus inter pares,62 the authors
were clear that no single principle overrides the others.63 That caveat aside, it
58 The principle of autonomy can be seen to be woven through the fabric of the law in many Western juris-
dictions and it has a significance far beyond that noted in the commonly cited Anglo-American cases. In Spain,
for instance, the courts have recognised that a non-pecuniary (yet nevertheless compensable) harm is inflicted
where a doctor proceeds without obtaining the ‘informed consent’ of their patient: see Marı́a Paz Garcı́a Rubio
and Belén Trigo Garcı́a, ‘The Development of Medical Liability in Spain’ in Ewoud Hondius, The Development
of Medical Liability (CUP 2010) 183.
59 See Bernard Berofsky, Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy (CUP 2007) 9.
60 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) 72.
61 For the concept of Principlism, see ibid. 13-25.
62 In Airdale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 893, Lord Mustill notes that cases of mercy killing are il-
legal because ‘as in the other cases of consent to being killed, the interest of the state in preserving life overrides
the otherwise all-powerful interest of patient autonomy’.
63 Beauchamp and Childress (n 60) 99.
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is clear that autonomy has developed a strong position in modern healthcare
and ethics, and has driven a discourse with the individual/patient as decision
maker. Autonomy is therefore often defined as the ability to exercise free
choice over the course of one’s decisions and one’s body. This requires that
the individual has the capacity to make meaningful choices, and is free from
external influences which impact that choice. To be autonomous, actions must
be voluntary. This involves a level of freedom from influence which withstands
the pressures that others might bring to bear on the individual. Beauchamp
and Childress offer a three-condition approach to autonomy which requires
that the individual is capable of an intentional act, has a substantial degree of
understanding (because requiring perfect understanding would rob most of us
of autonomy most of the time), and a lack of external influences or internal
mental conditions which would otherwise limit that voluntary choice.64 Thus,
the ability to be self-determining feeds directly into legal conceptions of
capacity.
In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 defines incapacity as
the inability to make a decision because of mental impairment or dysfunction,
and, further, as a state in which the individual cannot understand, retain, use
or weigh information in order to come to a decision, or as an inability to
communicate that decision.65 The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000
defines incapacity as an inability to act, or make, communicate, understand or
retain a memory of a decision.66 The principle of autonomy in its guise as
a right to self-determination also infiltrates established human rights, and
statements are made within Strasbourg jurisprudence in the context of the in-
terpretation of the right to respect for one’s private life under Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, to the effect that
Though no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as
being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion
of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its
guarantees.67
Within common law jurisprudence, there are numerous examples wherein
the courts have upheld the decision of the individual on those very grounds of
autonomy and self-governance. Such examples are not limited by jurisdic-
tion.68 Thus, in America, Cardozo J states that ‘Every human being of adult
64 Beauchamp and Childress (n 60) 102–3.
65 s 3, applicable to England and Wales only.
66 s 1(6), applicable to Scotland only.
67 Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 [2002] 35 EHRR 1, para 61.
68 Nor, indeed, are such instances limited to the common law world. In France, for instance, although ‘the
Conseil d’Etat have to date refused to compensate specifically for loss of autonomy [sine damno]’, the courts in
this jurisdiction have nevertheless afforded compensation in instances in which patients have suffered loss or in-
jury as a result of physicians’ disregard for their rights of autonomy: Simon Taylor, ‘The Development of
Medical Liability in France’ in Hondius (n 58) 104.
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years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body’,69 and in Canada, Cory J stated the following:
It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily integrity. This
encompasses the right to determine what medical procedures will be accepted and
the extent to which they will be accepted. Everyone has the right to decide what is to
be done to one’s own body. This includes the right to be free from medical treatment
to which the individual does not consent.70
In England, the importance of capacity finds expression in Re T (adult: refusal
of medical treatment),71 where the hospital was granted an order to give a blood
transfusion to a patient who had refused such treatment in writing, prior to
deteriorating to the point where emergency intervention was necessary. The
court found that she had refused treatment under the influence of her mother.
It was therefore able to find that her refusal of treatment was not a genuine
exercise of her autonomy, and that her medical condition rendered her incap-
able of making a valid refusal of life-saving treatment. Notwithstanding the de-
cision in this case, the judgment makes the competent adult’s right of refusal
abundantly clear. So we find Lord Donaldson asserting that ‘If the patient had
the requisite capacity, [doctors] are bound by his decision. If not, they are free
to treat him in what they believe to be his best interests’,72 and that ‘the
patient’s right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.73 He went on to state that
‘Prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he
will accept medical treatment, even if a refusal may risk permanent injury to
his health or even lead to premature death’.74
This reasoning was echoed in Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust,75 which
involved a request from a patient, who had the requisite ‘capacity’, to with-
draw ventilation, even though such would almost certainly lead to her death.
Lady Butler-Sloss affirmed that ‘Unless the gravity of the illness has affected
the patient’s capacity, a seriously disabled patient has the same rights as the fit
person to respect for personal autonomy’.76 Lord Goff stated, in relation to a
competent adult’s refusal of treatment, that the doctors must follow the indi-
vidual’s wishes, no matter how unreasonable the refusal.
To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to the principle
of self-determination and, for present purposes perhaps more important, the doctor’s
duty to act in the best interests of his patient must likewise be qualified.77
69 Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92, 95.
70 Ciarlariello v Schacter [1993] 2 SCR 119, 135.
71 [1993] Fam 95.
72 Re T (n 71) 113.
73 Re T (n 71) 113.
74 Re T (n 71) 115.
75 [2002] 2 All ER 449.
76 ibid 472.
77 Airdale NHS Trust v Bland (n 62) 864.
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Thus, medical practitioners are obliged to respect any decision to refuse
treatment made by competent patients, even where that decision seems un-
usual, if not downright bizarre, to others,78 and even if it will precipitate their
death.
While the principle of autonomy may justify the legal position as expressed
in Ms B, it provides little guidance in cases concerning decision making for
individuals who lack capacity. Infant children clearly lack decision-making
capacity79 and so, in such cases, the assumption is that the parents (biological
or legal) will share a decision-making role with the child’s clinical team and
jointly make decisions with that team on the basis of the ‘best interests’ of the
child.80 This forms a necessary exception to the modern pendulum swing to-
wards individual patient autonomy and leaves decision making for children
and others who lack capacity firmly within traditional paternalism. The basis
for subsequent court intervention in such cases arises solely where clinicians
and parents cannot agree on a course of action. Given the nature of these
cases and the reasonably urgent time frame involved, there is generally a press-
ing need for ‘a’ decision to be made.
Lord Donaldson’s decisions resonate through the English case law of the
1990s. In Re C (a minor) (withdrawal: medical treatment),81 the court, concur-
ring with his judgment, allowed the hospital to withdraw treatment, based ex-
plicitly on considerations of that child’s welfare, well-being and best interests.
Little over a year later, in Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment),82
Lord Donaldson noted that ‘there will be cases in which . . . it is not in the
best interests of the child to subject it to treatment which will cause it
increased suffering and produce no commensurable benefit’.83 His Lordship
went on to set out several key points for consideration in cases of this kind:
that there was a presumption in favour of life, but that it must be considered
from the assumed position of the patient; that decision making is a cooperative
effort between doctors and parents (or courts, in cases of wardship), where all
decisions must be made in the ‘best interests’ of the child; and that no deci-
sion taken on the basis of ‘best interests’ should be considered as one designed
to bring about death, other than as a side effect.
The English courts have deliberately left the definition of ‘best interests’ un-
clear.84 Although it has been emphasised that no attempt should be made to
78 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.
79 The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 1(4) allows children under the age of 16 in Scotland to
have capacity to consent to medical treatment, where a qualified medical practitioner is convinced that child is
capable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the proposed treatment, thereby echoing
aspects of the guidance laid down following the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health
Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402.
80 On this, see Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930.
81 [1990] Fam 26.
82 Above n 80.
83 Re J (n 80) 939.
84 Wyatt v Portsmouth NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1181, para 88.
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lay out specific criteria for the determination of ‘best interests’, it has been
recognised that the determination of ‘best interests’ must be judged from the
assumed perspective of that child (or other incapax person), with a strong but
rebuttable presumption in favour of life. In making any decision to withdraw
or continue treatment of children, the courts have emphasised that the welfare
of the child is key. The pattern developed by the courts in cases of this kind is
brought out in An NHS Trust v MB.85 There is no role in such cases for either
substituted judgment or assessments of what the reasonable doctor or parent
would do.86 All cases stand on their own facts. The views of doctors and
parents must be carefully considered, but are not relevant to the test, centred
as it is on the patient’s ‘best interests’.
What constitutes the child’s ‘best interests’ is determined by the court, using
its own objective judgment, with ‘best interests’ being understood in its widest
sense, including medical, emotional, sensory and instinctive87 considerations.
The court in MB recognised that taking a ‘balance sheet approach’ can help;
this involves looking explicitly at the relative benefits and burdens of the treat-
ment, while simultaneously acknowledging that there can be no computational
basis for assessing their relative weights.88
The importance of finding the balance between benefits and burdens is well
illustrated by An NHS Trust v A and B and another,89 involving a dispute be-
tween doctors and parents over the continued treatment of a severely brain-
damaged infant, for whom there was no possible treatment and for whom
death was inevitable. The Trust had made an application to the court for a
declaration that it would be lawful and in his best interests for him not to be
ventilated and resuscitated, and for his treatment to be limited to palliative
care. His parents wanted further trials of drugs to combat his seizures, along
with continued ventilation and CPR. The medical evidence was clear that
there was no possible benefit from any further drug treatment, and that re-
ventilating and resuscitating him caused pain and distress. Relying on Re T
(Wardship: Medical Treatment),90 Russell J determined that it was within the
power of the English courts to overrule the parents in accordance with the
guidelines set out in Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt,91 which focus on an ob-
jective assessment of best interests, balancing welfare in the widest sense with
the presumption in favour of life, looking from the assumed position of the
85 MB (n 27) para 16.
86 This common law position stands in contrast to the position under Scots law, which—due to the operation
of parens patriae and in line with the explanation of that jurisdiction discussed in Gyngall (n 22)—must explicitly
substitute its judgement for those of the doctors or parents should a dispute ultimately lead to a petition to the
jurisdiction of the Inner House.
87 ‘Instinctive’ relates to the innate human instinct to survive.
88 MB (n 27).
89 [2018] EWHC 2750 (Fam).
90 [1997] 1 WLR 242.
91 Above n 27. As is discussed below, this may not be the case in Scotland, however, if the parens patriae jur-
isdiction may only be exercised in cases concerning ‘infants who have had the misfortune to lose their parents’
in line with Lord Cranworth’s statement in Stuart v Moore (n 77) 910.
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patient. In balancing the burdens of his untreatable seizures, and the pain and
distress involved in his ultimately futile current treatment, against the minimal
level of comfort he appeared to derive from contact with his parents, Russell J
concluded that it was in the child’s best interests, and lawful, for the treatment
to be withdrawn, and for his life to come to as comfortable an end as possible.
It should be noted that there is an evident reluctance by the courts to rule
against the decision of a doctor, if to do so would require them to treat their
patient contrary to their clinical judgment, as can be seen from Re J (a minor)
(child in care: medical treatment).92 The net effect of this judgment must be
that, while the explicit position is that the court decides, there are few instan-
ces where the doctor’s decisions are not, in reality, determinative. A reluctance
to decide a case so as to force a doctor to treat against his clinical judgment
must surely mean that medical considerations carry greater weight. If, for ex-
ample, medical considerations determined that treatment was not in the
child’s best interests, but non-medical factors on the balance sheet indicated
that continued treatment would be in the child’s best interests, the authority
of Re J would demand that the balance be reversed in favour of the doctor’s
assessment, because to do otherwise would require the courts to force the doc-
tor to treat the child against his clinical judgment. In Scotland, however, these
matters are dealt with by parental fiat. The doctor’s role is to persuade the
parents of the efficacy of his proposed course of action. The ‘parents’ may be
the biological or legal parents, failing whom the court, acting as parens patriae.
Due to these differences in procedural law, the hands of the Scottish courts are
more constrained than those of the English courts. In Scotland, it might not be
possible for the Court of Session to give effect to the will of the doctors because
the court must do more than simply declare their proposed course of conduct
lawful. As is elucidated below, since the court must act as though it were the pa-
tient or the parent of the patient, the Scottish courts are obliged to give due con-
sideration to the subjective will of the patient (if such can be determined): thus,
it might be concluded that Scots law gives more weight in these circumstances to
parental autonomy than would be the case south of the border.
3. The Scottish Legal Position
A. A Looming Issue: Whither Scots Law?
The adjectival law which would regulate a case such as Gard or Evans, should
similar facts confront the Court of Session, differs materially from the procedural
92 1993 Fam 15. This reluctance is also present in Scotland, as demonstrated in Finlayson (n 55), where par-
ental refusal was overridden in favour of the clinicians who advocated the standard treatment. Meyers also refers
to the strong tradition of deference to doctors’ clinical judgements in Scottish medical practice: David W
Meyers, ‘Letting Doctor and Patient Decide: The Wisdom of Scots Law’ in David W Meyers and David L
Carey Miller (eds), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas B Smith QC
(Butterworths 1992) 91
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law that governs the English High Court.93 Indeed, the substantive law of
Scotland, and the rationale underpinning it, also differs from the positions
expressed by Francis J and Hayden J in Gard and Evans. It is not competent
for a physician to seek a declarator from the Outer House of the Court of
Session that their proposed course of conduct is lawful. Rather, the physician
must directly petition the Inner House of the Court of Session to use its inher-
ent parens patriae jurisdiction and consent on behalf of the patient, as if the
court itself were the parent.94 This parens patriae jurisdiction might apply in
cases concerning incompetent adults or infants95 and has a long history, but
has not received much consideration in Scottish legal literature.96
Historically, the Kings of both Scotland and England held parens patriae jur-
isdiction over their subjects.97 The emergence of the parens patriae jurisdiction
in Scots law has not been studied in any great detail,98 but it is clear that by
the 16th century the Scottish monarch was expressly given the care of the
helpless ‘when agnates [ie male lineal blood relatives] fail’.99 This exercise of
parens patriae practically occurred in the appointment of tutors dative, on the
authority of the King, through the King’s Court of Exchequer.100 Though the
Court of Session could also, by the 18th century, concurrently appoint tutors
by exercising its nobile officium101 (that is, the ‘extraordinary equitable juris-
diction of that court’102), as a strict matter of law,103 appointments of tutors
dative were still said to be passed ‘by the King alone, as pater patriae’.104
By the mid-19th century, ‘the whole power, authority, and jurisdiction’ of
the Court of Exchequer in Scotland was transferred to the Court of
Session.105 Since it was already possible for the Court of Session to appoint
tutors dative by exercise of the nobile officium even prior to this, it has subse-
quently been posited that the parens patriae power of this court is now little
more than an applied exercise of the nobile officium.106 In his monograph on
the nobile officium, however, Thomson notes that, although this position gener-
ally suffices in matters of practice,107 it remains conceptually clear that parens
93 See Law Hospital (n 14) 329 (Lord Milligan).
94 Law Hospital (n 14) 319.
95 See Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 4.21.
96 One of the few exceptions is Professor Laurie’s treatment of the jurisdiction: see Laurie (n 11) 95.
97 Laurie (n 11) 95; the King of Scots held this jurisdiction ‘since the days of Alexander II [1198–1249],
and probably even of William the Lion [1142–1214]’, whereas in England ‘the history of the parens patriae juris-
diction begins in the reign of King Edward I [1272–1307]’: see Thomas Innes of Learney, Scots Heraldry
(Oliver and Boyd 1956) 213; Paul LG Brereton, The Origins and Evolution of the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction
(Lecture on Legal History, Sydney Law School, Friday 5 May 2017).
98 Further study of parens patriae in early Scots legal history would be welcome, but beyond the scope of this
article; at present, Laurie’s article offers the most comprehensive treatment: see Laurie (n 11).
99 See Craig (n 13) 9.
100 Stair, Institutes, I, vi, 11.
101 See Law Hospital (n 14) 326 (Lord Cullen).
102 Thomson (n 13) 1.
103 See the comments of Lord Cringletie in Bryce v Graham (1828) 6 S 425.
104 Erskine, Institutes, I, vii, 9.
105 By virtue of s.1 of the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 1856.
106 See the discussion in Thomson (n 13) 120.
107 Cumbria County Council v X 2017 S.C. 451, para 25.
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patriae is of a far narrower remit than the more general equitable jurisdiction
of the Court of Session.108 The conflation of parens patriae and nobile officium
is, however, understandable, due to the judgment in Stuart v Moore.109 In this
case, the Lord Chancellor suggested that the Court of Session’s nobile officium
jurisdiction was conferred upon it by the Sovereign, who stood as parens pat-
riae,110 and this jurisdiction gave the court a ‘duty to take care of all infants
who require their protection, whether domiciled in Scotland or not’, empha-
sising that ‘the benefit of the infant is the foundation of the jurisdiction, and
the test of its proper exercise’.111
Such does not appear to accurately reflect the nature of the nobile offi-
cium,112 which, as argued before the Inner House the previous year, was
invoked in Stuart in a peculiar sense, as a ‘jurisdiction that might be exercised
to aid in giving effect to the orders of a foreign Court’,113 being that the
Court of Chancery was and is foreign to Scotland.114 Indeed, it appears (as
indicated in the English, but not the Scottish, case report) that the Lord
Chancellor’s judgment was not properly concerned with the nature of the
parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court of Session at all, but rather with the
more general point that both the Supreme Courts of Scotland and the English
Court of Chancery, ‘representing the Sovereign as the parens patriae, were
bound to assist each other in doing what was necessary to ensure the benefit
of the infant [in Stuart]’.115 The Lord Chancellor appears to have been
expressing two distinct points: that the authority of the court descends ultim-
ately from the Sovereign, and a more specific statement about the application
of the nobile officium to the case at hand.
In the same case, Lord Cranworth more clearly explains the nature of the
parens patriae jurisdiction within Scotland.116 Though he noted that this juris-
diction might sometimes correlate with the nobile officium, as it did in
Stuart,117 it was said that ‘the Crown [is] parens patriae, and protector, there-
fore, of infants who have had the misfortune to lose their parents’.118 Since
the Court of Session was recognised as possessing a nobile officium (ie equit-
able) jurisdiction which ‘corresponds very much to that which exists in the
Lord Chancellor in this country [ie in England]’,119 it was possible for the
108 Thomson (n 13) 120.
109 (1861) 23 D 902.
110 See Stuart v Moore (n 109) 908 (the Lord Chancellor).
111 See Stuart v Moore (n 109) 908 (the Lord Chancellor).
112 Indeed, when the case was remitted to the Inner House, Lord Inglis said ‘it is truly lamentable, that the
Court of Session, and the rules and principles which guide and regulate its proceedings, should be so little
appreciated or understood’ in the English courts: see Stuart v Moore (n 109) 914 (the Lord Justice-Clerk).
113 Stuart v Moore (1860) 22 D 1504, 1507
114 The nobile officium has, indeed, been used in the 21st century as a means of recognising the otherwise un-
enforceable rulings of English courts: see Cumbria CC, Petitioner 2017 SC 451.
115 Stuart v Moore (1861) IX House of Lords Cases (Clark’s) 440, 441.
116 Stuart v Moore (n 109) 910 (Lord Cranworth).
117 Stuart v Moore (n 109).
118 Stuart v Moore (n 109).
119 Stuart v Moore (n 109).
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Scottish court to uphold the judgment of the English court by utilising its
nobile officium and—in the circumstances of the case, given that the benefit of
the infant was paramount120 and that the House of Lords had ruled that it
would be in the interests of the child for the English judgment to be exe-
cuted121—the Supreme Courts of Scotland were obliged to make use of this
mechanism.122 Thus, Stuart recognised that the nobile officium was merely, as
an equitable mechanism, one possible means of fulfilling the court’s duty to
exercise parens patriae jurisdiction; parens patriae and nobile officium cannot be
said to be, therefore, one and the same.
Accordingly, it appears clear that the Court of Session presently has parens
patriae jurisdiction not as a part of its nobile officium, but rather due to its in-
heritance of the ‘whole power, authority and jurisdiction’—including parens
patriae—of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland.123 Thus, nobile officium fol-
lows from the court’s authority to enact the decisions of the parens patriae, not
vice versa. Though the power of parens patriae over adults was withdrawn in
England and Wales by the Mental Health Act 1959, the relevant provisions of
this Act did not extend to Scotland.124 The Mental Health (Scotland) Act
1960 fulfilled much the same role in Scots law, ‘sweeping away’, as stated in
Re: F,125 all previous ‘lunacy’ legislation. The Scottish Act, however, did not
alter the inherent powers of the Court of Session.126 Thus, the Scottish
courts’ exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction was not affected by the 1960 Act
and so parens patriae remains of relevance to Scots lawyers today in cases of
adult persons of unsound mind, as well as in cases of tutory.127
The continuing relevance of parens patriae was affirmed in 1996, in Law
Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate,128 where the Court of Session ruled that
the jurisdiction extended to incapable adults, as well as those patients who are
in a persistently vegetative state (PVS).129 This decision, in line with the
English decision of Airdale NHS Trust v Bland,130 held that the withdrawal of
artificial hydration, nutrition or non-palliative treatment may be in the ‘best
interests’ of a PVS patient.131 In recognition of this, the court utilised its
parens patriae jurisdiction to authorise the withdrawal of treatment and, in
doing so, noted that, functionally, ‘authorisation in the exercise of [parens
120 Stuart v Moore (n 115) 469 (Lord Cranworth): ‘there is but one object which ought to be kept strictly in
view, and that is, the interest of the infant’.
121 Stuart v Moore (n 109) 914 (the Lord Justice-Clerk).
122 Stuart v Moore (n 109) 914 (the Lord Justice-Clerk).
123 See the discussion in Thomson (n 13) 119; Law Hospital (n 14) 314 (Lord President Hope).
124 Mental Health Act 1959, s 150.
125 See In re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 58.
126 Laurie (n 11) 98.
127 See Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 4.21.
128 Law Hospital (n 14).
129 Law Hospital (n 14) 324 (Lord President Hope).
130 Above n 62.
131 Law Hospital (n 14) 329 (Lord Milligan).
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patriae] jurisdiction [has] the same effect in law as if consent had been given
by the patient’.132
The court in Law Hospital noted that they ‘were not referred to any Scottish
case in which the parens patriae jurisdiction [had] been exercised in this way
[ie as a means of authorising the withdrawal of medical treatment]’.133
Similarly, there was ‘almost no guidance in the Scottish authorities, such as
they are, relating to the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction with regard to
the test to be applied in deciding whether or not a course of conduct should
be authorised’.134 Nevertheless, the Inner House determined that the parens
patriae jurisdiction could be utilised as requested by the pursuers135 and that
the test to be applied was, as elsewhere,136 that of ‘best interests’.137
The language of ‘best interests’ echoes the opinion in Stuart v Moore that
the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court of Session behoves judges to do
what is ‘necessary to ensure the benefit of the infant’, that being ‘the founda-
tion of the jurisdiction’. The idea of the ‘benefit of the [incapax]’ thus corre-
lates with the concept of ‘best interests’ as it operates within Common law
jurisdictions; indeed, the corpus of authority concerning such was drawn upon
by the Inner House in Law Hospital. Accordingly, the decision of the court in
Law Hospital merits deeper consideration.
B. Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate
The facts of Law Hospital, at first sight, do not concern withdrawing treatment
from a terminally ill infant, although the case nevertheless represents the last
word, in Scotland, on the subject of withdrawal of medical treatment from in-
capable patients. In Law Hospital, it was held that a declarator that the con-
duct of the physicians would be deemed lawful was thought to be appropriate
in the case;138 however, the court stressed that subsequent complex cases
should proceed by petition to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Inner
House, and that declarators in such cases would be inappropriate.139 There
have been no such reported petitions to this court since Law Hospital in 1996,
however.
At the time that the Law Hospital case went to court, the patient had been
in a persistent vegetative state for four years.140 All her surviving relatives
agreed that treatment should be discontinued.141 The Lord Advocate did not
132 Law Hospital (n 14) 315 (Lord President Hope).
133 Law Hospital (n 14) 315.
134 Law Hospital (n 14) 315 (Lord President Hope).
135 Law Hospital (n 14) 319 (Lord President Hope).
136 Law Hospital (n 14) 316 (Lord President Hope).
137 Law Hospital (n 14) 318 (Lord President Hope).
138 Law Hospital (n 14) 319.
139 Law Hospital (n 14) 319.
140 Law Hospital (n 14) 305.
141 Law Hospital (n 14) 305.
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oppose this;142 he appeared only as ‘defender in the public interest’.143 The
dispute was not between the family members and the clinicians; rather, the
central issue was said to be one of procedural law tinted with ethical con-
cerns.144 The Inner House recognised that ‘court procedures differ in many
respects from those in England, and materially so in the present context’.145
These differences did not result in a different practical outcome from the com-
parable English case of Bland,146 but the reasoning of the court was necessar-
ily distinct.147 Noting that the ‘wardship jurisdiction is, in modern form, the
exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction formally vested in the sovereign’,148
the Court of Session referred to the English case of Re: B,149 in which the
‘primary and paramount consideration’ was held to be the welfare and best
interests of the ward.150 Recognising that ‘the same test is [also] being
adopted where the parens patriae jurisdiction is not now available’,151 (then)
Lord President Hope held that the law of Scotland ‘should approve of the ap-
plication of that [the ‘best interests’] test in such cases where the issue is
whether a tutor-dative should be authorised to consent to medical treatment
[or indeed withdrawal of treatment] of the ward’,152 on the basis that
it would be unsatisfactory if the court were to be required, in the exercise of [parens
patriae] jurisdiction, to apply different tests according to the circumstances of each
case . . . The better course is to recognise that all these cases require to be decided by
reference to the same fundamental principle.153
Accordingly, although Law Hospital was concerned with an incapable adult,
since the decision was predicated on the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction,
the principles are also relevant in determining the law on the withdrawal of
treatment from terminally ill infants. Referring to an unnamed Irish Supreme
Court case,154 the Court of Session determined that there was no principled
reason why it should not ‘decide what is for the benefit of persons [who are of
nonage, or mentally incapable] and thus incapable of taking decisions for
themselves’.155 As Lord Clyde indicated,156 the court felt that proceeding on
the basis of providing authorisation on behalf of the incapax, rather than on
142 See Clarke v Fennoscandia Ltd 2008 SC (HL) 122, para 27.
143 Law Hospital (n 14) 302.
144 Law Hospital (n 14) 305 (Lord President Hope).
145 Law Hospital (n 14) 329 (Lord Milligan).
146 Above n 62; see also Sheila AM McLean, ‘Permanent Vegetative State and the Law’ (2001) 71(s1)
Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 26.
147 Though it was clear that the court found ‘the reasoning in that case wholly persuasive’: Law Hospital (n
14) 321 (Lord Clyde).
148 Law Hospital (n 14)316 (Lord President Hope).
149 B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation), In re [1988] AC 199.
150 Law Hospital (n 14) 316 (Lord President Hope).
151 As in F (n 125) and in Bland (n 62); see Law Hospital (n 14) 316 (Lord President Hope).
152 Law Hospital (n 14) 317 (Lord President Hope).
153 Law Hospital (n 14) 317.
154 Irish Supreme Court, In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
155 Law Hospital (n 14) 315 (Lord President Hope).
156 Law Hospital (n 14) 321–4.
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permitting the withdrawal of treatment on the basis of declarator, had distinct
advantages.157 Procedurally, this was not least because a declarator from the
civil court could not lawfully bind either the Lord Advocate or the High
Court of Justiciary158 and, ultimately, because ‘the consequences of permitting
the civil court to determine directly matters properly falling within the separ-
ate jurisdiction of the criminal court could lead to some considerable
confusion’.159
In respect of the criminal dimension of Law Hospital, the Lord Advocate
had undertaken to ‘make a statement on his policy as to whether or not to
prosecute’,160 and this was promptly issued,161 indicating that, although there
was no impetus in the civil law to petition for authorisation in every case, the
Lord Advocate would only guarantee that no prosecution would follow where
the Court of Session had provided such authorisation.162 In a paper delivered
to the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow (in an ‘unofficial
ambience’)163 soon after the policy statement, the Lord Advocate stated that
‘it is for doctors and relatives involved in such tragic situations to decide
which course of action they should adopt’.164 Thus, as Laurie, Harmon and
Porter observe:
both the Lord Advocate and the Lord President of the time agreed that decisions
could be made on medical grounds or independently of the courts—but neither gave
any guidance as to when it would be either necessary or unnecessary to seek judicial
approval.165
Although prosecutorial policy, if not the letter of the civil or criminal law,166
became unclear after Law Hospital, no Scottish court to date has prosecuted a
physician for withdrawing treatment. This is so despite the fact that, similarly,
there has been no reported case concerning a petition to the Court of
Session’s parens patriae jurisdiction,167 yet ‘if a person does something which
he knows will cause the death of another person, he will be guilty of homicide
if his act is the immediate and direct cause of the person’s death’.168 Though
the newly reconstituted Scottish Parliament passed the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act in 2000, this did not change the position of the criminal or
157 Law Hospital (n 14) 315 (Lord President Hope, concurring with Lord Clyde).
158 In contrast to the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court (in non-Scottish cases), the Court of
Session has no jurisdiction in criminal matters.
159 Law Hospital (n 14) 315 (Lord Clyde).
160 Law Hospital (n 14) 315.
161 1996 SCLR 516.
162 ibid.
163 See Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.125.
164 Lord MacKay of Drumadoon, ‘Decision on the Persistent Vegetative State: Law Hospital’ (1996) paper
presented at the Symposium on Medical Ethics and Legal Medicine, Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
of Glasgow (12 April 1996).
165 Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.125.
166 See Ross v Lord Advocate [2016] CSIH 12, para 29 (Lord Carloway, then the Lord Justice-Clerk).
167 See the discussion in Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.127.
168 Ross (n 166) para 29.
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civil common law on the withdrawal of treatment.169 Indeed, the (then)
Scottish Executive stressed that withdrawal and withholding decisions were
outwith the purview of the legislation.170 The Scottish medical and legal pro-
fessions have, therefore, operated—in cases concerning both adults and
infants—on the basis of a generous interpretation of Law Hospital. As a matter
of practice, ‘the decision as to whether an application is necessary [rests] in
each case with those who will be responsible for carrying that intention into
effect’171 (which in cases concerning PVS patients and terminally ill infants
will invariably be the treating clinicians). Thus, treating clinicians—if un-
opposed by the patient’s relatives172—in fact have a free hand (on the basis of
‘indefensibly vague’ limitations)173 to determine the outcome of such cases.
In Law Hospital, Lord Milligan explicitly called for legislation on this issue,
recognising that ‘the need for legislation concerning the substance of author-
isation is the same in Scotland as in England’.174 None has been forthcoming
from either jurisdiction, despite the re-establishment of the Scottish
Parliament just a few years after this case. In the absence of legislation, and
any further Scottish case law concerning withdrawal of treatment, the com-
mon law as expressed in Law Hospital continues to apply in Scotland. As
such, as a matter of public policy rather than of law, it appears that the
Scottish medical profession has been granted an exceptional privilege to deter-
mine what is in the ‘best interests’ of those under its care, and to act accord-
ingly, without much legal oversight or interference.
This is problematic, not least because the Inner House in Law Hospital ex-
pressly refused to rule on the question of criminal culpability. Though it might
be hoped that ‘good common sense would prevail’ in even difficult cases,175 it
seems naive to do nothing more than trust in the wisdom of those who hold
high office. The possibility of the Crown Office initiating a prosecution of any
physician who has acted without approval from the Court of Session remains
open, even if it might be unlikely. Likewise, though private prosecution in
Scotland is extremely rare,176 it cannot be presumed that parents, faced with
the prospect of losing a child,177 might not push for a private prosecution, or
(perhaps more likely) for civil redress.
169 See the discussion in Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.127.
170 Scottish Executive Policy Memorandum, 8 October 1999.
171 Law Hospital (n 14) 319 (Lord President Hope).
172 Law Hospital (n 14) 319.
173 See Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) paras 15.121–15.127.
174 Law Hospital (n 14) 329 (Lord Milligan).
175 Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n 9) para 15.126.
176 In order to raise a private prosecution, the would-be prosecutor (if wishing to prosecute under solemn
procedure, as would be necessary in a case of this kind) must apply, by bill, to the High Court for a grant of
‘criminal letters’. Such would not ordinarily be forthcoming without the support of the Lord Advocate, although
such is not, strictly speaking, necessary. Nevertheless, there has only been one private criminal prosecution in
Scotland within the last century: X v Sweeny 1982 JC 70. See Timothy H Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law
(7th edn, W Green 2018) para 2-53.
177 As in Evans, in which it was noted that the child’s parents could not comprehend the reality of the end-
of-life care plan constructed by the clinicians: see Evans (n 36) paras 10–11.
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C. Gard, Evans and the Court of Session
But for one complication,178 at common law, there would have been no justi-
ciable conflict between the physicians and parents in any Scottish analogue to
Gard or Evans, since patria potestas was vested in the father in respect of his
legitimate children.179 Patria potestas historically carried with it ‘powers of cus-
tody, residence, education, general upbringing, religious training, legal repre-
sentation and medical treatment’.180 Accordingly, fathers made the ultimate
decision as to all medical treatment (and, by inference, withdrawal of treat-
ment).181 The Scottish courts, then, would have been forced to yield to the
expressed wishes of the father;182 there would have been no scope for the
parens patriae jurisdiction to be invoked.183 In the words of Wilkinson and
Norrie, the authors of the leading Scottish text on the law of parent and child:
The father, it was held, was the best judge of what was in the interests of the child.
The court interfered where the child’s welfare was seriously endangered by the
father’s conduct, not because the law was otherwise neglectful of the interests of the
child but because, unless there was clear evidence that the father was abusing his
position, interference by the court would be to substitute an inferior for a superior
view of where those interests lay.184
Absent statutory enactment, it is clear that parens patriae jurisdiction could be
invoked only ‘where agnates fail’.185 With the introduction of the
Guardianship Act in 1973, mothers also acquired patria potestas,186 but by
then the power had been significantly diluted.187 The power conferred on
mothers is nevertheless such that they too would enjoy the normal powers of
parenthood, meaning that the parens patriae jurisdiction can only be exercised
not simply where agnates fail, but, indeed, where all cognates fail.
By the 1990s, the control granted by patria potestas had entirely ceased to
be judicially recognised and the common law had been largely replaced by
statute.188 At present, since ‘it would be open to the Court of Session in exer-
cise of its parens patriae jurisdiction to make orders authorising or prohibiting
178 That is, the fact that neither the parents of Charlie Gard nor Alfie Evans were married; the patria potestas,
discussed below, operated only in respect of legitimate children at common law. The status of ‘illegitimacy’ has
now been abolished, in Scotland, by s 21 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.
179 Norrie (n 9) para 1.28.
180 David W Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (2nd edn, Stanford UP 1990) 156.
181 ibid.
182 Again; provided that the children were ‘legitimate’.
183 Patria potestas was, in spite of its nigh unlimited nature, not a power comparable to dominium or ‘owner-
ship’ in Roman or Scots law, even notwithstanding the fact that infant and pupil children are conceptualised as
‘property’ for the purposes of Scots criminal law: see Jonathan Brown, ‘Plagium: An Archaic and Anomalous
Crime’ [2016] Jur Rev 129, passim.
184 Norrie (n 9) para 1.28.
185 Recall Sir Thomas Craig (n 13).
186 From s 10 of that Act.
187 See Kenneth McK Norrie, ‘Legislative Background to the Treatment of Children and Young People
Living Apart from their Parents: Report for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry (2018) 14.
188 Norrie (n 9) para 1.04.
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medical treatment’,189 parens patriae now holds supremacy over any residual
patria potestas. In a complete reversal of the common law position expressed
by Wilkinson and Norrie,190 in the ‘rare and exceptional’191 cases in which
parents disagree with physicians as to the question of withdrawing treatment,
the view of the father (and mother) may now be expressly deemed to be infer-
ior to that of the court. Thus, were a case akin to Gard or Evans to arise in
Scotland, it would be competent for the physicians to petition the Court of
Session to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction and substitute its own deci-
sion—which would be, in fact, the decision of the attending physicians—for
that of the biological parents.
Since such a case has not yet arisen, the likelihood of the court granting
such a petition cannot be definitively known. While, at one time, the Scottish
courts were deferential towards decisions made by medical practitioners,192
which explains in large part the paucity of medico-legal cases,193 the attitude
of judicial submission has softened even in this one-time bastion of medical
paternalism.194 Patients are no longer seen as the passive recipients of medical
care, but rather as persons—or, indeed, consumers—holding rights and exer-
cising choice.195 Thus, it is open to the Scottish courts, in the 21st century, to
favour the opinions of the parents of a terminally ill child, in circumstances
akin to Gard or Evans, rather than to favour those of the medical
professionals.
Since the Scottish courts must arbitrate between the competing views of the
physicians and parents before expressly setting down its own view, as parens
patriae, of where the ‘best interests’ of the child lie, they must have greater re-
gard to public policy matters in the parent–child relationship. Unlike in
England and Wales, it is not competent for the court to state that it is simply
declaring that the physicians’ proposed conduct is lawful; the Court of Session
must additionally subordinate the will of the parents to its own, should they
side with medical opinion. Since ‘the contentious aspect of the case[s of Gard
and Evans] is the issue surrounding parental autonomy’,196 this places the
court in a difficult position; thus, in spite of the fact that they could now do
so, the Scottish judiciary might be reluctant to utilise its parens patriae
189 Norrie (n 9) para 7.34.
190 Norrie (n 9) para 1.28.
191 To paraphrase Meyers (n 92) 97.
192 See the discussion in Meyers (n 92) 91–3.
193 Lord President Clyde famously attributed the comparable absence of Scottish claims of physician malprac-
tice to ‘the high standard in general of the medical profession in Scotland’: see Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200,
205. The judiciary seems to have consistently endorsed this assessment: see Moyes v Lothian Health Board 1990
SLT 444.
194 See the discussion in Graeme Laurie, ‘Personality, Privacy and Autonomy in Medical Law’ in Niall R
Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (Dundee
UP 2009) 454–7.
195 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board Scotland [2015] UKSC 11, para 75.
196 Gillett (n 6).
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jurisdiction in any case in which the biological parents of the child expressed a
contrary will.
4. Conclusion
Every lawyer is familiar with the ‘reasonable person’. It is perhaps reasonable
to conclude that ‘parents, physicians and other caregivers, intimately con-
nected through the birthing process, are the individuals best suited to make
these intensely personal and wrenching decisions’ concerning the withdrawal
of medical treatment from terminally ill children.197 The law, though, cannot
presume that all parents or persons will behave reasonably under such extraor-
dinarily circumstances. There must be judicial mechanisms in place to arbi-
trate between competing positions. Though the majority of cases might be
practically resolved without recourse to such legal mechanisms—indeed, an
additional extra-legal process of physician–parent mediation might prove use-
ful in cases where there is a real danger of a breakdown in communication—it
does not follow that there is no need to explore the letter of the law in this
area. The law must be equipped to deal with the (understandably, given diffi-
cult circumstances) intractable and unreasonable person.
In Scotland, the letter of the procedural law differs materially from that in
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Rather than deciding such cases by
way of declarator, the Scottish court, in Law Hospital, expressed that such
cases should be decided by petitioning the parens patriae jurisdiction of the
Court of Session. This jurisdiction allows the court to substitute its own deci-
sion for that of the biological parents. Similarly, though in practice physicians
have enjoyed free reign to withdraw treatment if, in their opinion, it is not in
the ‘best interests’ of that patient, it is likewise open to the court to refuse
consent to the withdrawal of such treatment. No Scottish physician has been
prosecuted for withdrawing treatment in the absence of the consent of the
Court of Session. It might be inferred that this is because it is difficult, if not
impossible,198 to prove that a physician, acting with therapeutic intent, exhib-
ited any criminal or culpable mental state. Thus, in the absence of express
determination by the courts that the withdrawal of treatment is not in the best
interests of the patient, Scottish prosecutors have tended to presume thera-
peutic motive and abstain from prosecution. Since it is exceedingly difficult to
raise a private prosecution in Scotland, it might be concluded that Scottish
physicians will not be held criminally culpable for exercising their medical
judgment in the absence of an express refusal of consent set out by the parens
patriae. It is only if a physician unsuccessfully petitions the Court of Session,
197 Meyers (n 92) 97.
198 See eg HM Advocate v Ross National Archives of Scotland, JC26/1967/117, High Court of Edinburgh trial
papers, 24 January 1967.
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before proceeding to withdraw medical treatment regardless, that the criminal
law might come into play.
The fact that the Scottish courts must exercise their parens patriae jurisdic-
tion in cases concerning the withdrawal of treatment from a terminally ill in-
fant has not proven problematic in practice, since Scotland has continued to
observe its tradition of deciding medical matters privately.199 However, it is
quite possible that the Scottish courts could, as a result of the key procedural
difference discussed here, decide a case analogous to Gard or Evans differently
from the English courts. This is so since the Scottish courts would be forced
to expressly balance the competing interests of the parents and the physicians
in deciding whether or not to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction. Since, histor-
ically, parens patriae could be utilised only if the incapax had no surviving (or
legally recognised) parents, the Scottish courts might be reluctant to employ
their parens patriae jurisdiction to unequivocally subordinate the views of the
parents to those of the court.
With that said, since parental potestas has largely been replaced by a statu-
tory regime which confers less power on parents than they enjoyed at common
law, it is, of course, possible that the Scottish courts would trek a similar tack
to the English courts. This does not change the fact that, though they would
assess whether or not to do so with reference to the ‘best interests’ test, they
would be forced to arrive at, and state, their conclusion by way of a notably
distinct legal process. To speak of the topic of withdrawing treatment from ter-
minally ill infants as a ‘UK medical law matter’ is, therefore, to err.
199 See Meyers (n 92) 92.
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